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INTRODUCTION
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) confronts society
and the law with a host of problems. Employment discrimination
has already arisen as one of the more contentious of these prob-
lems. AIDS has several unique aspects that make employment
discrimination issues controversial and complicated. First, there
is neither a vaccine nor cure for the disease. Second, it appears
to be 100% fatal. Third, it is contagious. These three factors
have caused considerable fear in the populace directed towards the
victim or carrier of the disease even though it is believed to be
almost impossible to contract the disease through casual contact
with a carrier. Fourth, in the United States it has been a
disease primarily limited to male homosexuals and intravenous drug
abusers. Homosexuals, although generally not favored in our
society, have proven to be a very vocal and assertive force in
demanding protection from all forms of discrimination. Fifth, a
person may be contagious but asymptomatic for years. It is not
yet. known how many* of these asymptomatic carriers will go on to
develop AIDS; estimates range from 4% to 100%. Sixth, there are
medical conditions between AIDS and asymptomatic carriers of the
AIDS virus where the victim suffers from various physical mala-
dies. This is generally know as AIDS related complex (ARC)
.
Victims of AIDS and AIDS related conditions are discriminated
against for many reasons. Fear of contagion, which bears on
customer preference, co-employee concerns, and the employer's own
fear and prejudice, is one reason. Discrimination may also be

based on concern over increased medical and life insurance pre-
miums, increased medical care expenses, absenteeism, short career
potential, aggravated workers' compensation claims, or prejudice
against homosexuals, the group most identified with the disease.
Federal and State laws enacted to protect the handicapped
from discrimination are being used by those with the AIDS and AIDS
related conditions to combat employment discrimination in both the
hiring and firing of workers. The applicability of many of these
statutes to AIDS is still in dispute. This paper will examine the
application of Federal Rehabilitation Act to AIDS victims.
Handicap protection statutes are of recent origin. Case law
interpreting the statutes has only started to burgeon during the
last five years. The statutes have been construed to cover a wide
variety of conditions not traditionally recognized as handicaps.
Consideration of diseases as handicaps has met with mixed results
under these statutes. For example, in New York and Wisconsin
cancer is a protected handicap, while in Illinois it is not.
Technology is now developing that will allow us to tell, even
in the womb, if an individual is at risk of developing such things
as heart disease, cancer, or muscle diseases, sometime during
his life. The rules laid down in the AIDS cases will probably
have application in determining whether such tests can be used to
screen for the healthiest candidates for employment, thereby
ensuring minimal medical costs.

AIDS: THE DISEASE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
AIDS: In General
The first cases in the United States of what would lead to
the identification of AIDS were reported in 1981 when several
otherwise healthy male homosexuals were diagnosed with either a
1 2
rare opportunistic infection (01) , or cancer typically occurring
only in individuals with severely compromised immune systems.
Initially referred to as "gay-related immune deficiency" (GRID)
,
the designation was changed to Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) in 1982 when it became apparent that the syndrome was not
3limited to male homosexuals. The term AIDS is used exclusively
for cases that fit the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC)
surveillance definition. This definition has been evolving since
41982 as more is learned about the disease.
Basically, AIDS is a disorder of the human immune system
leading to enhanced susceptibility to particular opportunistic
5infections and certain cancers. In the immune-depressed victim
these infections or cancers will eventually bring about the
person's death. It is important to note that AIDS compromises
7
only a portion of the victim's immune system. As a consequence,
the AIDS victim is susceptible to the particular infections and
cancers that would normally be controlled by the compromised
o
portion of the immune system. The AIDS victim is not at any
special risk from many common germs such as those causing the
common cold. The opportunistic infections that do pose a risk are
often present in the victim's body before his immune system is
9
compromised. This becomes important when considering whether the

AIDS victim is at any special risk by being exposed to germs
common to most work environments.
The AIDS victim may die from the first opportunistic infec-
tion that he develops or he may recover from the infection. Each
bout with an infection, however, further weakens the individual
until at some point an infection, or cancer, proves fatal. The
immediate effects of the 01 or cancer may range from mere discom-
fort to complete disablement, requiring hospitalization. This
is important when considering whether the individual is physically
capable of performing a particular job once AIDS has developed.
Once AIDS develops, the average victim's life expectancy is
12
12 to 18 months. As of December 1986, CDC reported that 79% of
13those diagnosed before January 1985 had died. Chances of
14
surviving more than 5 years after diagnosis of AIDS are slim.
There are no known cases of anyone recovering from AIDS. This
poor prognosis is important to the employer who invests time and
money in training an employee he expects to employ for more than a
year.
HIV Infection; The Heart of the Matter
Despite its notoriety, AIDS is only a narrow point on a wide
spectrum of illnesses resulting from a human- immunodef iciency-
virus (HIV) infection. HIV is an infectious and communicable
17
retrovirus that infects a particular subset of white blood cells
(T4 lymphocytes) resulting in the dysfunction of the infected
1
8
cells and the multiplication of the virus. The subset of cells
involved are essential for stimulating the immune system to

generate antibodies against various bacteria, fungi, protozoa,
viruses, and neoplasms.
There is also evidence that HIV can infect brain cells
20
resulting in neurological diseases such as dementia. To what
extent the virus causes direct damage to the brain versus indirect
damage through compromising the immune system in the brain is not
completely understood. In September 1987, the CDC will expand the
definition of AIDS to include individuals infected with HIV who
have dementia.
HIV infection is a necessary condition for the development of
22AIDS. Individuals who are not infected with HIV cannot develop
AIDS. A person infected with HIV may remain healthy and complete-
23ly asymptomatic. Such individuals are generally referred to as
"seropositive". Estimates of the percentage of seropositives who
24
will develop AIDS range from 4% to 100%. This wide range
reflects the limited knowledge currently held on the pathogenesis
of the disease.
Although it is known that HIV infection is a necessary
condition for developing AIDS, it is not known if it is a suffi-
cient condition. Some experts hypothesize that co-factors must be
25present before the seropositive individual will develop AIDS.
It is also unknown to what extent the infected individual ' s immune
system can combat or suppress the virus. To date, however, there
are no known cases of a person infected with HIV becoming free of
the virus. There is no cure for the infection and no known way to
prevent seroconversion.

Once a person becomes infected, he may develop symptoms in a
27
matter of months, years, or never. Based on current statistics,
however, it appears that 4 to 20% of those infected will develop
28AIDS within 5 years.
The HIV infectee may develop illnesses resulting from immune
deficiency that do not fall under the CDC surveillance definition.
29These illnesses include lymphadenopathy syndrome (LAS)
,
pro-
30longed unexplained fever, mylagia, fatigue, gastrointestinal
31
symptoms, and sore throat. These manifestations are generally
32
referred to as AIDS-related complex (ARC) . LAS/ARC fill in
more of the spectrum of illnesses resulting from HIV infection.
CDC does not monitor reports of LAS/ARC. As a result statistics
33
on LAS/ARC are not as readily available as with AIDS. One
study, however, estimates that 25% of HIV infected individuals
34
will develop ARC.
LAS and ARC are not necessarily stages in the development of
AIDS. A person may go from seropositive to AIDS directly, and a
person who develops LAS or ARC might never develop AIDS. One
study reports that 29% of HIV patients with LAS progressed to AIDS
within 4*5 years.
Less is known about HIV infection of brain cells than white
blood cells. It appears possible that neurologic infection can
take place even though there is no evidence of immunodeficiency.
It is also estimated that 60% of AIDS patients will develop
37dementia. Neurologic infection may first manifest itself as
depression, forgetfulness, poor concentration, psychomotor retar-
dation, decreased alertness, apathy, withdrawal, and loss of

3 8libido. These problems are of particular importance in employ-
ment situations where concentration and coordination are necessary
for safety or productivity. At the extreme, the victim may
39
experience profound dementia, seizures, coma, and death. The
neurological illnesses complete the spectrum of illnesses re-
sulting from HIV infection.
Risk Groups
In the United States, AIDS is still a disease predominately
occurring in homosexual/bisexual men and intravenous (IV) drug
40
abusers. The cases break down as follows:
RISK GROUP % CASES
Homosexual/Bisexual Males 66
IV Drug Abusers 17
Homosexual/Bisexual IV Drug Abusers 8
Heterosexual Partners of Infected Persons 4
Recipients of B3ood Transfusions 2
Persons with Hemophilia or Coagulation Disorders 1
No Risk Group/Others 2
There can be Little doubt that these statistics will influ-
41
ence the general public's perception of the disease. Homosexuals
and drug abusers are not generally favored in our society.
Extending employment discrimination protection to diseased homo-
42
sexuals may not be popular in many areas of the country. As a
result it can be expected that different forums in different areas
of the country will construe employment laws that might apply to
HIV/LAS/ARC/AIDS in various fashions.

Transmission
Who is contagious . It is generally held that a person may be
43
contagious from the time of infection to after death. Our
knowledge in this area is not complete. There is definite evi-
dence, however, that a seropositive individual can transmit the
44
virus. There is no reason to assume that an infected individual
is not contagious at any given time.
How HIV is transmitted . HIV has been isolated from the
blood, semen, saliva, tears, breast milk, cerebrospinal fluid,
neural tissues, female cervical and genital secretions, and urine
45
of infected individuals. Given the fact that the virus infects
and reproduces in white blood cells (T4 lymphocytes) it is theore-
tically possible to find the virus in any body fluid or tissue
46that contains such cells. The corollary to this is that in
order to infect an individual the virus must reach the victim's
white blood cells alive.
It is easy to document how HIV can be spread, but more
difficult to prove how it is not spread. Epidemiologic evidence
in the United States has implicated only blood and semen in
transmission, by way of anal or vaginal intercourse, use of
contaminated IV needles, or receipt of tainted blood product
47transfusions. The evidence to date indicates that HIV is not
transmitted through casual contact, insect bites, or foodborne,
4b
waterborne, or airborne means. Most notably there have been no
documented cases of the virus being transmitted through saliva by
49biting or kissing.

The Center for Disease Control has stated that w [t]he kind of
nonsexual, person-to-person contact that generally occurs among
workers and clients or consumers in the workplace does not pose a
risk for transmission." This position is based primarily on the
available data of existing cases and only partially on our under-
standing of the biologic limitations of the virus. Given that
we only have data concerning cases over the past 7 years and the
fact that the data is largely limited to HIV infections that have
progressed to ARC or AIDS, there is no guarantee that our statis-
tical data accurately predicts all modes of transmission. Conse-
quently, transmission through some forms of casual contact cannot
be categorically ruled out, but statistically the risk of trans-
mission through casual contact appears minimal.
The CDC has noted that there are some risks of transmission
by infected health care workers who are involved in invasive
procedures or have contact with the mucous membranes of the
52patient. Simple precautions can and should be taken by all
health care workers to eliminate these risks. Similar risks and
precautions apply *to personal-service workers whose service
involves breaking the skin, such as in tattooing, acupuncture, and
53
ear-piercing. The CDC sees no special risk for other personal-
service workers, or food-service workers transmitting HIV, but
54goes on to discuss them because of public concern. The Center
emphasizes the importance of good hygiene and sanitation practices
of such workers. Food-service workers who cut themselves while
working should discard any contaminated food. Both food and

personal-service workers with running lesions or weeping dermati-
tis should refrain from contact with clients or food.
CDC ' s caution in making these "gratuitous" recommendations
illustrates the limits of our knowledge and understanding of the
transmission of the virus. Do we have enough statistics from the
last five years to feel confident that the risk of transmission is
de minimis ? Is statistical evidence concerning the lack of risk
enough or should our risk assessment be premised on the actual
biologic limitations and strengths of the virus — information we
do not currently have? Public health officials seem to think that
our current statistical and scientific information is sufficient
to conclude there is little risk. Some courts and administra-
57tive agencies agree. Many more will be called upon to decide
this issue.
Fear . No matter what the experts say, many people will fear
5 8
contact with HIV-infected persons. This is not surprising given
the mystery of the disease and its potentially fatal and incurable
consequences. Many people believe cancer is contagious and shun
those who have it » or have recovered from it even though our
knowledge of cancer is more extensive and the evidence against
59
contagion more conclusive than for AIDS.
Several studies have shown that people do not generally
assess risks in a rational manner. People respond to the
hazards they perceive as they perceive them seldom utilizing
statistical data. Instead they use judgmental rules, known as
6 2heuristics, to analyze the risk. In most cases heuristics work
fine, but in others they distort the risk by either exaggerating
10

6 3it or minimizing it. Consequently, education will not neces-
sarily control the fear of AIDS. Where education leaves off, the
law can step in and penalize people for holding and acting upon
certain fears. In the area of civil rights, for example, the law
penalizes those who discriminate against others because of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or handicap in many
situations. The civil rights cases are slightly different because
they generally involve hate, bias, and prejudice unrelated to
fear. The legislatures and courts are, of course, free to ignore
any distinction between unreasonable hate and unreasonable fear,
but someone acting out of fear might warrant more consideration
than one acting out of hate, especially considering the difficulty
in assessing the reasonableness of a particular fear.
Testing
Prior to 1985 there was no screening test available to
determine if a person was infected with HIV. Asymptomatic car-
riers of the virus could not be identified and consequently
discrimination of this class of individuals was not a concern. In
1985, an enzyme-link immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to detect HIV
64
antibodies was licensed by the Food and Drug Administration.
The test was originally used as a means of protecting the coun-
try's blood supply. A positive test result also came to be part
of the CDC surveillance definition of AIDS. In addition, it
gave employers, insurance companies, and the government a means of
discovering who had the virus, thus establishing a new group for
discrimination. The size of this group has been kept relatively
small because of actual and potential legal limits to testing ana
11

the short time that the test has been available. With mandatory
testing being seriously advocated at both the state and federal
level, this class could exceed a million persons depending on how
much of the population is tested.
The ELISA works on the assumption that persons exposed to HIV
will develop specific antibodies to the virus. If a person
carries the antibodies it is proof that they have been exposed to
the virus because the antibodies do not develop without prior
exposure to the virus. The test does not establish the continued
presence of the virus, but there are no documented cases of a
ft R
person with the antibodies not having the virus. A more expen-
sive ($100 versus $2-3) and complicated test, called the Western
69Blot test, can be used as a confirmation test. This test
identifies the antibodies through a method measuring the specific
70
molecular weight of the antibodies and proteins.
Because these tests screen for the antibodies and not the
virus itself, persons infected with HIV who do not develop the
antibodies will test negative. It appears that such persons are
generally limited t6 individuals who are already immune-impaired,
71young children, or those only recently infected with the virus.
False negatives may also result from errors in testing. The
sensitivity of the test, i.e. the percent of infected persons it
72
will correctly identify, is 93.4 - 99.6%. False positives may
also occur. The specificity of the test, i .e. the number of
73
negative results in a non-infected group is 98 . 6 - 99 . 6% . By
repeating the test on a positive specimen, the number of false
74positives is reduced but not eliminated. The number of false
12

positives can be reduced further by using the Western Blot test to
confirm the ELISA.
Economic Impact:
As already mentioned, one aspect of the AIDS crisis is
dealing with irrational or exaggerated fears. The law can be used
to penalize people who discriminate because of such fears. It can
also be used to compel people to ignore these fears. Such laws
raise very emotional and political issues. Another very political
issue is deciding who will pay the financial cost of AIDS.
Between 1981 and 1986 over $1.1 billion was spent on medical
75
care for AIDS patients. Seven billion dollars were lost because
7 fi
of lost productivity and earnings. Conservative estimates
indicate that there will be over 270,000 cases reported in the
United States between 1981 and 1991 at a cumulative cost of over
$8.5 billion and lost earnings and productivity of $55.6 bil-
77lion. More pessimistic observers estimate over 400,000 cases
with a cumulative medical cost between 37 and 112 billion dol-
78lars. Medical costs per patient can be expected to increase as
drugs, such as AZT,*thax: prolong life but do not cure, are deve-
loped.
A recent survey of California hospitals estimates hospital
costs between $52,000 and $70,000 per AIDS patient per 18 months
79(the average life expectancy) . AIDS patients stay in the
hospital longer per visit and cost more per day than all other
80patients. State Medicaid paid over 50% of these hospital
8
1
costs. Uncollectible bills from AIDS patients were over 3 times
higher than the average for all other patients, leaving the
13

8 2hospital to pay for much of the care. The RAND Corporation
estimates that Medicaid will pay for over a third of the medical
Q O
costs resulting from AIDS between 1986 and 1991.
The medical cost of AIDS can be shifted among four pockets:
1) The Government (taxpayer)
.
2) The hospitals through uncollectible bills.
3) The patient.
4) Insurance.
Eighty-five percent of insured health care is provided through
84
employment. Employers providing health care benefits to their
employees can seek to minimize their costs by discriminating
against those infected with HIV. Most Americans do not have
private, individual health insurance. For these people, when they
lose their job they lose their insurance. Individual policies are
usually expensive and may not even be available to a person
infected with HIV. The employer and the insurance companies may
benefit from employment discrimination, but the cost just shifts
to the other three pockets.
In minimizing health insurance cost through discriminating
against HIV-infected individuals, the employer shifts to the
government the responsibility to support a potentially productive
worker who may end up on the welfare rolls. Society also loses
the benefit of the victim's productivity. In the case of the
seropositive person who may never develop AIDS, this would be a
costly and senseless waste. Current estimates indicate that there
are between 1 and 1.5 million people in the United States infected
85
with HIV (approximately 1 for every 200 people)
.
If the author-
ities who are pressing for mandatory testing are successful, a
very large group may be subject to discrimination. In the absence
14

of any prohibition against employment discrimination, mandatory
testing could have a significant impact on governmental budgets at
all levels, assuming the government will have increased Medicaid
and welfare recipients and a reduced tax base as the result of
discrimination.
The impact of discrimination on the victim is also worth
considering. There is the obvious loss of salary and the more
significant loss of health insurance benefits when the person
ft ft
needs them most. As AIDS becomes more prevalent in the hetero-
sexual community, consideration of the impact on dependent family
members will become more pressing. Rejecting an otherwise quali-
fied and productive individual can also be expected to inflict a
heavy psychological toll and possibly precipitate development of
8 7AIDS if self-esteem and stress are co-factors, as some suggest.
From a public health point of view there is no evidence that
society will benefit or be protected by removing the HIV-infected
person from the work force.
Against these considerations it must be kept in mind that by
forcing an employer to hire an otherwise qualified HIV-infected
individual we are interfering with his right to hire and fire who
he wants, and run his business as he wants. There is precedent
for this in civil rights acts, but in our "free" society further
incursions on traditional rights are not readily adopted. Some
commentators, however, argue that the "employment at will" concept
is out of date in modern industrialized society and advocate a
"just cause" requirement in all employment hiring and firing
8 8decisions
.
15

If the employer is unable to avoid sharing a portion of the
cost of AIDS through job discrimination, he will naturally attempt
to shift the burden to the consumer of his product or service to
the extent the market will allow. The consumer instead of the
taxpayer will foot the bill in such cases.
The financial burden can be further adjusted by prohibiting
insurance companies from adjusting the rates of employers with
8 9HIV-infected personnel. The insurance companies would have to
cover the added risk by increasing their rates in general, passing
the risk to the general insurance pool.
FEDERAL LAW ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
90Traditionally, employment was at will. An employer could
reject a job applicant or fire an employee for any reason unless
91limited by an employment contract. Legislation and judicially
developed employment law have modified this general rule in many
92
circumstances. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and
93
national origin. The Act has broad application, applying to all
employers in an industry affecting commerce who have 15 or more
94 95
employees. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
96prohibits employment discrimination based on age. The Act also
entitles employees aged 65 through 69 to coverage under group
97health plans under the same conditions as any other employee.
The Act applies to all employers engaged in an industry affecting
9 8
commerce who have twenty or more employees. Neither of these
Acts prohibit employment discrimination based on the medical or
99physical condition of the employee or job applicant. No con-
16

stitutional protections or common law rights specifically protect
the handicapped from discrimination.
In 1973 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act affording
the handicapped limited protection from employment discrimi-
nations. Although not enacted with the express intention to cover
a phenomenon like AIDS, the Rehabilitation Act and its counter-
parts enacted by the States have become the prime means by which
102persons with HIV infection and AIDS seek protection.
THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Legislative History and Purpose .
The Rehabilitation Act followed from legislation that had its
origin in 1920, directed toward rehabilitation programs for dis-
abled veterans of World War I and victims of industrial acci-
dents. 103 Amendments in 1943, 1954, 1965, 1967, and 1968 funded
research, extended benefits and expanded the class of persons
104
eligible for rehabilitation services. There were no provi-
sions concerning employment discrimination until the 1973 Act.
The bulk of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 deals with voca-
tional rehabilitation services, research and training, and the
establishment of the National Council on the Handicapped. Title
V, at the end of the Act, entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions"
includes three sections on employment discrimination, sections
- n . 105 cno 106 , _«, 107 _. , n c _.501, 503, and 504. The underlying purpose of these
sections is to guarantee the "employability , independence, and
10 8integration into the workplace" of individuals with handicaps.
The legislative history on these sections is not detailed, but the
17

Courts construing the Act have discussed three basic legislative
concerns regarding discrimination against the handicapped:
1) All the money spent on rehabilitation would be wasted if
109
employers unreasonably refused to hire the handicapped.
2) Employers receiving federal funds or contracts should
bear some of the cost in the effort to provide work for the
handicapped.
3) The handicapped should be protected from unreasonable
biases, prejudices, fears, and insensitivities, and receive
evenhanded treatment in the job market.
Overview of the Act
112The statutory scheme . Section 501 of the Act requires
each department of the executive branch of the Federal government
to submit affirmative action programs for the hiring, placement,
113
and advancement of handicapped individuals This section has
been construed to prohibit discrimination by the executive
114branch, but has been the subject of limited litigation because,
until recently, most jurisdiction did not recognize a private
right of action under its provisions. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has promulgated regulations interpreting
section 501.
117Section 503, with some exceptions, requires that contracts
with the federal government in excess of $2,500 include provisions
that the contractor take affirmative action to hire the handi-
118
capped. This section, like section 501, has been construed to
119prohibit employment discrimination against the handicapped. J A
private right of action under section 503 is not generally recog-

120
nized. Enforcement of section 503 lies with the Office of
121Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) in the Department of Labor.
OFCCP has also promulgated regulations interpreting section
122503. z
Section 504 prohibits discrimination by the executive branch
123
of the Federal government, recipients of Federal financial
124
assistance, ana recipients of Federal Revenue Sharing pay-
125
ments from discriminating against individuals with handi-
126
caps. The Department of Health and Human Services has issued
127
regulations supplementing section 504. The Attorney General has
128
enforcement responsibilty for violations of section 504. A
private right of action is recognized under section 504 which may
129be pursued regardless of the actions of the Attorney General.
Consequently, section 504 has received much more attention than
section 501 and 503 in the courts.
Elements and defenses . There are four elements to a case
brought under sections 501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act:
1) The plaintiff must be an individual with handicaps, a
history of handicaps or perceived to be handicapped.
2) The plaintiff must be otherwise qualified for the job at
issue.
3) The plaintiff was discriminated against solely by reason
of the handicap (s).
4) The employer is the executive branch of the Federal
government or a recipient of either federal financial assistance
K * 131or revenue sharing payments.
19

In the context of HIV/ARC/AIDS each of these elements could
be the basis for controversy. The first two elements, however,
raise unique considerations when applied to HIV/ARC/AIDS cases.
The crux of the first element is proving that HIV-infection, ARC,
or AIDS is a handicap under the statute. Once a jurisdiction
recognizes a particular condition as a handicap, subsequent
plaintiffs with the same condition will only have to prove they
132have the condition. Consequently, the case of first impression
in each jurisdiction determining the status of HIV infection, ARC
and AIDS under the statute will in effect either open or close the
door to future plaintiffs with these conditions. Commentators
133generally predict that AIDS will be considered a handicap. The
few district court decisions that have dealt with this issue
134
confirm these predictions. We are still, however, "reading tea
leaves on [how the courts will decide] the issue of the asympto-
,.135
matic carriers."
The second element of the plaintiff's case requires a showing
that the handicapped plaintiff is qualified for the job in spite
1 3 f>
of his handicap. v The courts generally look to see if the
137plaintiff is able to perform the essential functions of the
13 8job, with reasonable accommodation if necessary, without
139
endangering himself or others. The burden of establishing some
140
aspects of this element is often shifted to the defendant.
One method of shifting the burden of showing that the plaintiff is
not a danger to himself or others is to characterize this as a
141defense to being otherwise qualified. Other defenses based on
business justifications relate to efficiency and economic hard-
20

142
ship. The non-safety defenses generally meet with very limited
143
acceptance unless related to accommodation.
In cases involving individuals infected with HIV, safety and
economics will be the prime issues. The main safety issue con-
cerns the risk of transmitting the virus to co-employees or
customers. Given the limits to our understanding of the trans-
mission of the virus, whoever has the burden of showing there is
or is not a risk will have a difficult time. If the burden is on
the employer and he is unable to prove that there is a substantial
risk, then, in effect, the individual's co-workers and customers
will assume what the courts consider a nonsubstantial risk.
The third and fourth elements of the plaintiff's case raise
144
no unique issues in the AIDS context. The fourth element
145
substantially limits application of the Act. The vast majority
of commercial employers remain unaffected by the Federal statute.
Nonetheless, the Federal law is of critical importance to most
employers because most state handicap discrimination laws are
146patterned after the Federal statute. Federal court decisions
can be expected to influence state court interpretations of their
own acts.
Who is a Handicapped Individual
The threshold requirement to assert a discrimination claim
under the Rehabilitation Act is that the claimant is handi-
147
capped. The Act, as amended and expanded in 1974, defines a
handicapped individual as:
any person who (i) has a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (ii) has a record
21

of such an impairment, or.
fi
(iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment.
The expanded definition sought to extend protection to people who
were not currently handicapped but who had recovered from a
handicap or who were erroneously perceived as being handi-
, 149
capped.
The statute has been construed as requiring a two-pronged
analysis in defining a condition as a handicap: 1) there must be
an impairment, and 2) the impairment must substantially limit a
150
major life activity. What constitutes an "impairment," a
"major life activity," and a "substantial limit" have been ana-
lyzed with various results in many cases. Regulations supple-
152 153 154
menting sections 501, 503, and 504 have defined these
concepts in general terms, leaving courts wide latitude in their
application. Impairment is defined as:
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, . . ., affecting one or.pore of
the following body systems: neurological, 15g 159'
respiratory, . . ., hemic and lymphatic. "
The regulations supplementing section 503 define a person as
"'substantially limited' if he or she is likely to experience
difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment."
Major life activities include "caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working [emphasis added]." Courts have shown
considerable deference to these regulatory definitions when there
16 2
is a dispute over a condition being a handicap.
22

Given the many and varied manifestations of an HIV infection,
it is helpful to analyze the handicap status of seropositives, ARC
victims and AIDS victims separately.
The courts, administrative agencies, and commentators that
have considered the issue generally hold that individuals with
164AIDS are handicapped. This is because AIDS is a disorder of
the hemic and lymphatic systems and also because the opportunistic
infections associated with an AIDS diagnosis involve disorders of
other body systems. The AIDS victim is substantially limited in a
major life activity because of the debilitating effects of the
opportunistic infections and cancers. Even if the individual is
not currently afflicted with a debilitating infection, the high
probability and imminence of developing a disabling infection or
cancer warrants classification as a handicap. Courts generally
have not distinguished between handicaps that are disabling at all
times (e.g., blindness) and those that disable the person period-
ically (e.g., epilepsy). Consequently the fact that the AIDS
victim may experience periods of health will not disqualify him
from handicap status.
The more difficult case to decide is the seropositive indi-
vidual. The Supreme Court recently declined to consider this
1 cc
issue when given the opportunity. A Federal district court has
1 ft f
held that HIV infection alone is a protected handicap. The
court demonstrated either ignorance or indifference to the distinc-
16 7
tion between AIDS and seropositivity . Another Federal district
~\ f R
court held that seropositivity is a perceived handicap.
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Neither of these case engaged in the detailed analysis seen at the
appellate level in deciding whether a condition is a handicap.
The ARC victim falls between the AIDS victim and the seroposi-
tive individual. If HIV infection alone is a handicap, ARC must
be a handicap. If HIV infection is not a handicap, the ARC
victims may have to establish their status as handicapped on a
case-by-case basis.
In general, the number of cases where the definition of
handicap has been in question is limited. Among those cases,
. . , 169 , , . 170 171tuberculosis, congenital back anomaly, drug addiction,
172 173personality disorder, and hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke
174 175
were considered handicaps, while weight, lef t-handedness,
1 7 fi 177 1 7 R
cross-eyedness, transitory illness, fear of heights,
179 180
varicose veins, and sensitivity to tobacco smoke were not
handicaps
.
The focus and emphasis of the courts in this area has varied.
181 18 2Some key on impairment, others on substantial limitations,
and others spend little time on the question of handicap and
determine the case » instead by analyzing whether the person is
183qualified for the job. In reaching their results, the courts
generally try to effect what they perceive as the legislative
purpose of the Act, to protect people from unreasonable discri-
mination. The court can expand or contract the size of the group
entitled to protection by how it chooses to define handicap.
Nothing in the statute, the regulations, or binding precedent
currently dictates how a court should decide the handicap status of
ARC victims or seropositive individuals.
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There are several ways a court might analyze seropositivity
if it weit inclined to recognize it as handicap. These analyses
will be considered under the two prongs ol the definition of
handicap.
Prong 1; Impairment .
Job factor = Impairment . For the plaintiff, the most favor-
able definition of impairment, equates impairment to any condition
considered as negative by an employer in hiring or firing deci-
184
sions. E. E. Black, Ltd v. Marshall
,
provides one of the more
detailed decisions advancing this theory. Black involves a man
with a back anomaly who was denied employment as an apprentice
ICC
carpenter because of his back."1" In reaching its conclusion that
the man was handicapped the court noted that not only is a bad
back an impairment, but possessing average or normal physical
abilities is also an impairment when seeking a job where the
18 6
employer is seeking above average abilities. As an example the
court discusses a short persons desire to play professional
basketball. The only thing that saves professional teams from a
discrimination suit' is the inability of the person of average
18 7
ability to show that they are otherwise qualified for the job.
In effect, the court eliminates the requirement of proving impair-
ment. The black court's definition of "substantially limits a
18 8
major life activity" is almost as generous to the plaintiff. A
literal reading of Black renders the word "handicap" meaningless,
transforming the Rehabilitation Act into a universal discrimi-
nation law, imposing a "just cause" requirement for ail hiring and
18 9firing decisions.
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Other courts have cited much of Black with approval, but have
190
rejected the court's all inclusive definition of impairment.
Most courts do not consider minor defects or normal human limita-
191tions as impairments.
The seropositive individual is not physically impaired by the
virus in anyway. Consequently, unless a court is willing to
accept the Black analysis, a seropositive person is not currently
impaired under the normal use of the word.
Potential Impairment = Impairment or Perceived Impairment
.
The seropositive individual may not suffer from a current impair-
ment but he certainly has the potential to develop an impairment.
No Federal court has considered whether a potential impairment is
the same as an impairment. Two state courts construing state law
have rejected potential impairments as handicapping, while one
191
state court held the opposite position. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that n [f] airly construed . . . the statute
[is] intended to aid only those who are presently disabled.
192[Emphasis added.]" The California Supreme Court, in finding
hypertension to be a handicap, stated, "to limit 'handicap' to
193present disabilities would defy logic." Obviously a court can
go either way on this issue.
In a recent Federal district court case, the court held n [i]n
the present period of speculation and concern over the incurable
and fatal nature of AIDS, there is no doubt that a known carrier
194
of the virus is perceived to be handicapped." It is not clear
if the court is assuming that this perception exists because of
the potential impairment, because of the contagion, or because it
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assumes everyone is ignorant of the difference between AIDS and
seropositivity
.
If potential impairment equals impairment or perceived
impairment, the seropositive person would be impaired, but an
injustice will have been done to the English language. Equating
potential impairment to impairment will also significantly enlarge
the class of people entitled to protection under the Rehabilita-
tion Act. There are reasonable arguments that had Congress
foreseen the potential impairment issue arising they would have
195included it in the definition. To those who believe it is the
prerogative of the courts to decide cases based on Congressal
intent instead of what Congress said, the insult to the language
may be justified. One should keep in mind, however, that Congress
has made two substantive amendments to the employment provisions
of the Rehabilitation Act since 1973, indicating that Congress
is sensitive to changing needs in connection with the Act.
Contagiousness as an Impairment . Commentators have argued
197that contagiousness should be considered a handicap. Although
ft
recognizing that the seropositive individual is not directly
physically impaired by his contagiousness, he is indirectly
impaired because people will consider contact with him dangerous
and treat him accordingly. Some see support for this position in
the recent Supreme Court decision holding that discrimination
against someone with a disabling and contagious disease, solely
because of the contagion, is just as unlawful as discriminating
against them because of the disablement. The Court, referring to
AIDS, however, expressly refused to opine on whether someone who
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19 8is only contagious is handicapped. This is just another
attempt to stretch the definition of impairment beyond its normal
limits.
Conclusion on Prong 1
:
The bottom line is that we are
dealing with a statute that did not foresee a phenomenon like
AIDS. Attempting to find the answer in the plain meaning of the
words of the statute guarantees neither a just result nor fulfill-
ment of the legislative intent.
199The issue could easily be resolved by the legislature. In
the alternative, the courts will be called upon to determine the
scope of coverage. I would suggest that the problem be faced by
deciding whether "impairment" includes "potential impairments."
If it does, seropositive individuals would be impaired. It would
also include individuals who are genetically at risk of developing
heart disease, cancer, alcoholism, and various other maladies.
Medical science is now revealing that a prime factor in many of
these conditions is genetic. Technology is developing that will
allows us to identify those at risk. Just as the ELISA test
opened the door to 'discriminating against seropositives, the new
genetic technology could be the start of discrimination against
those with less than perfect genes.
By examining the statutory definition, it is obvious that it
applies to persons with current impairments, past impairments, and
perceived impairments. There is no express mention of potential
impairments. The fact that Congress provided for those with past
and perceived handicaps indicate that there is nothing magic about
actually having a handicap. Congress was interested in spreading
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the cost of employing the handicapped and maximizing the produc-
tivity of the handicapped by integrating them into society.
Does it make sense to prohibit discriminating against someone
mistakenly perceived as handicapped and not to prohibit it against
someone who is likely to become handicapped? Discriminating
against the handicapped in advance of their becoming handicapped
will make it all the more difficult to integrate them into society
and the workplace when the potential handicap becomes reality. In
the meantime, society will have lost the benefit of their produc-
tivity, and the employer who sought to avoid the economic conse-
quence of hiring an employee who might go from seropositive to
AIDS, may now be forced to hire the very individual he rejected
when healthy.
This argument is not as relevant if the motive behind the
discrimination is fear of contagion. If a court decides for
economic reasons that it serves the Congressional intent to
consider a potential impairment as an impairment, the actual
motive for the discrimination in each case becomes irrelevant so
201long as it relates to the potential impairment. Fear of
202
contagion is related to the potential impairment.
A problem could arise if it becomes possible either to
identify those seropositives who are likely to develop AIDS or
ARC, or to prevent some seropositives from developing AIDS
or ARC. We now have a class of people who are not potentially
impaired and may therefore be discriminated against. Attempts to
protect this class, however, would move further in the direction
of prohibiting all unreasonable discrimination and requiring just
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cause for all hiring and firing decisions. Perhaps the AIDS
phenomenon will become the springboard for a universal employment
discrimination law in the United States.
Prong 2; Substantially Limits Major Life Activity .
Much of the discussion under Prong 1 implied that once you
have a recognized impairment you are handicapped. In some juris-
dictions this can be the case where the courts say minor impair-
ments are not really impairments, so any impairment, by defini-
203tion, substantially limits a life activity. In theory, how-
ever, the plaintiff must establish that any impairment substan-
204tially limits a major life activity.
It is generally held that if an impairment causes difficulty
in obtaining satisfactory employment it substantially limits a
205
major life activity. Some question remains as to how much
difficulty there must be and what "satisfactory employment" means.
The most favorable approach for the plaintiff is holding that
rejection at even one job constitutes difficulty, and that "satis-
factory employment" is measured by the plaintiff's expecta-
tions. The more' common approach requires consideration of the
number and type of jobs from which the plaintiff is restricted,
the geographic area to which the plaintiff has access, and the job
207
expectations of the plaintiff. No court appears to require a
showing that the plaintiff has been denied employment from several
employers. Instead, the courts appear willing to speculate
whether or not the plaintiff is likely to encounter problems or if
the plaintiff is being unreasonably particular about the job he
wants. In practice, this prong is used to screen out what might
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be called frivolous suits involving relatively healthy and gener-
ally very employable individuals who demand that they be accommo-
dated in a particular job when similar jobs requiring no accommo-
dation are available. The second prong would probably never prove
fatal to a plaintiff's case before a sympathetic court.
The second prong can also be used as another approach to the
"otherwise qualified" issue. If an impairment only restricts an
individual from a particular kind of job the court may find that
2 08he is not substantially limited. This could apply in some
cases to HIV/ARC/AIDS when a person is restricted from certain
select jobs, such as surgeon, dentist, or chef.
Otherwise Qualified
A handicapped individual is not protected against discrimi-
209
nation unless he is "otherwise qualified" for the job. This
generally means that the plaintiff must be able to perform the
essential functions of the job, with reasonable accommodation, if
210
necessary, without endangering himself or others. Courts vary
on how they allocate the burden of establishing or rebutting each
211
aspect of this element. In all jurisdictions, the plaintiff
must show that, he can perform the essential functions of the job
but for his handicap, i.e. he has the requisite education,
212training, and experience. Some courts then shift the burden to
the employer to prove that the plaintiff's handicap somehow
prevents him from doing the job and that there is no way to
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff. Some courts require the
plaintiff to assume more of the burden in showing that he can
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safely perform the job or that he can be reasonably accommo-
* 4. ^ 214dated.
A defense of business necessity may also be available to some
employers when they refuse to hire a handicapped individual. In
most jurisdictions these defenses involve safety or efficient
performance of the essential functions of the job and, in effect,
merely shift the plaintiff's burden of proving that he is quali-
fied, to the employer to prove that he is not qualified. Some
cases, however, imply that a court may be willing to consider
factors bearing on business necessity that are not directly
related to the plaintiff's ability to perform the job. These
become particularly important in the HIV/ARC/AIDS context where
some of the employers' prime concerns involve collateral economic
cost of hiring or maintaining an employee who may generate large
medical expenses.
The main issues under the "otherwise qualified" element that
arise in the HIV/ARC/AIDS context can be broken down as follows:
A. Safety concerns
1. Risk of transmitting the virus
2. Risk of the infected person contracting a disease
3. Risk of industrial accidents
B. Economic concerns
1. Insurance and fringe benefit cost
2. Absenteeism
3. Low productivity
4. Short career potential
5. Disruption of the work place or co-worker preference
6. Loss of customers or customer preference.
Safety: The Risk of Transmitting HIV or OIs . In School
216
Board of Nassau County v. Arline the Supreme Court held that
"a person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infec-
tious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise
32

qualified for his job if reasonable accommodation will not elimi-
217
nate that risk." In deciding if the risk is significant a
court must consider: 1) how the disease is transmitted, 2) when
the person is contagious, 3) the severity of the risk, and 4) the
218probability of transmission. In evaluating these factors,
courts should defer to "the reasonable medical judgments of public
219health officials."
Given the mode of transmission and the low probability of
transmission, according to public health officials, it would be
difficult to consider an HIV carrier a significant risk to others
unless the court decides that the severity of the risk overshadows
220the low probability. Courts have also shown reluctance to rely
blindly on the assurance of public health officials and have been
unwilling to assume that the risk of transmission is minimal given
221the limitations to our understanding of the disease. Conse-
quently, the HIV carrier may be considered a substantial risk in
spite of public health officials 1 position on the low risk of
transmission.
The Supreme Court's standard does not consider an em-
ployer's tort law duty for the safety of his customers. By having
one responsibility regarding employing the handicapped and a
different duty toward customers, the stage is set for a customer
suing an employer for negligently hiring a person whom the Rehabi-
222litation Act required to be hired.
223
The formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. , of
B P x L, could offer an alternative to the Arline analysis of
substantial risk. Under this formula, if B, the burden to society
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and the individual in not being hired or retained is less than P,
the risk of transmission, times L, the severity of the consequence
of transmission, then discrimination is legal. This formula takes
into account both the employer's duty under tort law to his
customers and the Congressional interest in employing the handi-
capped balance against public health concerns. This approach is
not only more suited to effect the legislative purpose of the Act,
but it also provides a court with additional flexibility in
deciding cases. For example, a court might decide that there is
some risk short of substantial that an infected individual will
transmit the virus as a food handler. Under the Supreme Court
approach the analysis ends and the individual is qualified to be a
food handier. Under the Carroll formula the court can go on to
consider the plaintiff's ability to find different employment
where there is even less risk of transmitting the virus.
The AIDS victim with opportunistic infections (OIs) poses a
slightly different case. Most of the OIs which afflict an AIDS
victim are either difficult or impossible to transmit or, if
224transmitted, they are not a threat to a healthy person. If the
AIDS victim has active tuberculosis or some other contagious and
potentially dangerous infection it will have to be assessed under
225
the criteria announced by the Supreme Court in Arline. Because
the OIs that most AIDS victims contract are not a threat to
o o c
others, it would be unreasonable to expect that any presump-
tion that AIDS victims are unsafe because of opportunistic infec-
227
tions would withstand judicial scrutiny. Instead, a case-by-
case inquiry will be necessary to assess the risk of transmitting
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the particular infection. This illustrates another problem facing
the employer. He may be under a duty to continuously monitor the
health of employees with AIDS so he can take steps to protect his
other employees and customers should the victim develop a conta-
gious and dangerous opportunistic infection. This increases
business costs and raises employee privacy issues.
Safety: Risks to seropositive or immune-depresseed persons
.
Three factors are considered by courts is assessing whether safety
risks will justify discriminating against a handicapped person: 1)
the likelihood of harm, 2) the seriousness of the possible harm,
22 8
and 3) the imminence of harm. These factors apply whether the
risk is to the individual or to others. The standard announced in
229Arline , discussed above, is just a more specific application of
these general rules when the harm involves the risk of transmit-
ting a contagious disease.
The seropositive individual's immune system has not been
compromised, so he faces no particular risk of contracting di-
seases in the work place. The seropositive person, however, faces
the risk of developing ARC or AIDS. Our understanding of what
precipitates the development of ARC/AIDS is limited, but the
co-factors associated with it are not peculiar to most work
230
settings. The employer generally has the burden of proving
231that the handicapped individual's safety is at risk. Based
on the available medical data the employer would be hard pressed
to satisfy that burden. Courts generally disfavor paternalistic
232behavior towards the handicap. If the handicapped person is
willing to assume reasonable risks the court will support his
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choice and prohibit "well intentioned" discrimination. Not all
risks will necessarily be considered reasonable. For example, an
employer may be justified in rejecting a seropositive individual
for employment in areas or under conditions where adequate medical
resources are not readily available should the person develop
233AIDS. J
Contrary to some popular misconceptions, the immune system of
the ARC and AIDS victims is not destroyed. The immune system
depends on different components to accomplish various missions.
The immune system of the person with AIDS is no longer able to
perform some of those essential tasks. The body is then vul-
nerable to the diseases that are controlled by the compromised
234portion of the immune system, not to all diseases. For
example, the AIDS victim is not at risk of dying from a cold he
catches from a co-worker. Many of the opportunistic infections
that develop in the ARC/AIDS victim are found in everyone but are
controlled by the immune system. We do not understand the origin
or pathogenesis of all the opportunistic infections and cancers
associated with AIDS, but there is no current evidence linking the
majority of them with the work place. Nevertheless, certain
exceptions do exist. For example, one disease presents a hazard
for outside construction workers in portions of the southwest
United States where a fungus found in the dust can be inhaled if
235
the ^riust is stirred up and cause an infection. Jobs requiring
"if.
certain live virus vaccinations may also pose a risk, as do
jobs requiring prolonged travel in certain African and tropical
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237
areas. The State Department and military have usea both these
2 3 8justification in discriminating against ARC and AIDS victims.
For the majority of jobs it does not appear that the ARC or
AIDS victim will be at any special risk of contracting or aggra-
vating a disabling disease in the work place. The burden will be
on the employer to show that the person is at risk. Current
medical evidence would not support any presumptions that persons
with AIDS or ARC are at any special risk in the work place.
Safety: Risk of injury . The same factors considered for the
health risk of the handicapped individual apply to general risks
associated with industrial activity. The seropositive individual
is not at any increased risk of being injured or injuring others.
Should the seropositive person be injured, it is unknown if the
trauma can precipitate the development of ARC or AIDS.
The ARC or AIDS victim may suffer from fatigue, loss of
stamina, distracting discomfort, or even compromised mental
239function. Jobs operating or working near dangerous equipment
may present a risk to some AIDS victims and their co-employees.
Each person, however, is different, and it is not reasonable to
presume that all ARC and AIDS victims pose a substantial risk in
such environments. Without the benefit of any recognized presump-
tions the employer will have to assess and monitor the health of
employees with ARC or AIDS in dangerous work settings ana co-em-
ployees will assume any risk not rising to the level of substan-
tial. Where safety depends on the ARC/AIDS victim's attentive-
ness, an employer may be under a duty to monitor his health so he
can intervene if the worker's health endangers himself or others.
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Economics: Insurance and Fringe Benefit Costs . A reasonable
concern of employers will be the potential cost the HIV infected
individual will impose on health and life insurance programs.
There is no Federal precedent to support a defense based upon this
concern. In fact, there is evidence that any such defense would
be rejected. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act
240(ERISA) prohibits discharging an employee based on the poten-
tial impact the employee's medical condition would have on a
241
covered benefit plan. The Age Discrimination Employment Act
prohibits providing different fringe benefit plans to older
242employees than to younger employees. Employers' complaints
about increased medical cost for female employees because of
243pregnancy have also met a deaf ear. Finally, employers have
been barred in some jurisdictions from offering handicapped
employees reduced insurance coverage.
244The states considering this defense have rejected it. In
the few cases where cost arguments of this kind were given a
sympathetic ear, the court decided the case by holding the person
was not handicapped, never reaching the business necessity de-
- 245fense.
It seems unreasonable to dismiss employer financial concerns
out of hand. The increased cost to health and life insurance
programs are a collateral cost of employing the handicapped.
Costs necessary to accommodate a handicapped person are also
collateral costs. An employer is not required to employ a handi-
246
capped person if the accommodation costs are unreasonable. In
deciding the reasonableness of these costs, courts consider the
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size and type of the employer's operation, including the number of
employees and budget, as well as the nature and cost of the
247
accommodation. Courts have not characterized insurance costs
as accommodation costs. There appears to be little reason to
treat insurance costs differently from other collateral costs
associated with hiring the handicapped. If the magnitude of the
cost of insuring the HIV infected individual is large enough, the
courts could use the accommodation analysis to permit an employer
to discriminate. This might allow smaller or less prosperous
employers to avoid potentially devastating collateral costs. Even
from the perspective of handicapped individuals as a group, it
would be more fair to consider insurance costs as any other
accommodation cost. It makes little sense to the person in a
wheel chair who is denied a job, because it will cost the employer
$1,000 to accommodate him, to see an AIDS victim get the job who
might cost the employer tens of thousands of dollars.
Jurisdictions may avoid this entire issue by enacting laws
that prohibit insurance companies from pegging their rates to the
248HIV status of the insured. Insurance companies are designed to
absorb and redistribute risks of this nature while employers
generally are not.
Economics; Absenteeism, Low Productivity, and Short Career .
Presumptions that handicapped people will have absenteeism and
249productivity problems have met with disfavor. If abstenteeism
and low productivity actual occur, a handicapped employee may be
au a 250discharged.
39

There is no evidence that a seropositive individual will be
an unusually high risk in this area. The risk the ARC/AIDS victim
poses will depend on his current condition. In order to justify
discrimination because of short career potential , the employer
would have to show that this is a bona fide occupational require-
251
ment and not just a desirable qualification.
Economics: Disruption of Workplace/Co-employee Preference
.
Fear of AIDS can have a substantial impact on a business because
of the reaction of other employees. No matter how much you
educate and no matter how conclusive the evidence, a number, if
not the majority of people, will to some degree avoid the infected
individual. If an infected individual must work closely with
others or with the cooperation of others, tensions can be expected
252to arise. The work and morale of all concerned may be af-
fected. The non-infected worker may suffer stress related illness
because of his fear and successfully seek worker's compensa-
253tion.
Co-employee preference has never been recognized as an excuse
254for discrimination. Fear is different from prejudice, and an
employee has a right to work in a safe environment. Non-infected
workers might refuse to work around an infected person claiming
conditions are abnormally dangerous under either a labor contract,
255
section 7 of the National Labor Relation Act, section 502 of
the Labor and Management Relation Act, ~ or the general duty
257
clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Under some
circumstance the subjective beliefs will justify such refusal in
2 5 8
spite of the objective evidence disproving these beliefs.
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The employer may find himself in a no-win situation. If he
hires or retains an infected employee, other employees may stop
working. If a court finds that their subjective beliefs are held
in good faith or there is some reasonable basis for their fear,
259the employer cannot discipline them. If the employer fires the
infected employee, he may be successfully sued under the Rehabili-
tation Act. The safety standard under the Rehabilitation Act
merely requires that the infected person not pose a substantial
risk to others, which is not the same standard utilized in de-
ciding if the person is otherwise qualified. The potential for
contradictory results is obvious when the fearful employee needs
only establish a subjective, good faith basis for the fear. Even
under an objective standard there is no guarantee that a court
will not find sufficient risk to to justify a walkout, but not
substantial risk justifying termination of the infected employee.
It would not be the first time that an employer would be dammed if
"? fin
he does and dammed if he does not.
One partial solution is to educate employees about the
limited risk of transmission of the virus in the work place. This
may eliminate some of the fear and it will also serve to undercut
any good faith subjective fears. If this fails, the employer must
take his chances and either fire the infected employee or disci-
pline the fearful ones. It is too soon to tell which decision
poses the lesser legal risk.
Economics: Loss of customers/Customer preference . Fear of
AIDS can also cause customers to avoid a business with infected
employees. Cases under the Civil Rights Act have refused to
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recognize customer preference as a justification for discrimi-
nation. The courts note that the Civil Rights Act was passed
not only to overcome the prejudice of employers but also those of
2 6 2
the public at large. With AIDS we are generally dealing with
fear, not prejudice or hate. Fear is a different emotion from
hate and ought to be given greater consideration by any tribunal
that is thinking to suppress it. If the fear is totally unreason-
able, it may warrant little consideration. Fear of contracting
HIV cannot be said to be totally unreasonable given the current
deficiencies in our knowledge and understanding of the disease.
These factors distinguish HIV discrimination from racial discrimi-
nation, suggesting there should be some room to consider customer
preference when it comes to fear of contracting a disease.
I would propose that customer preference based on safety be
allowed as a defense to firing a contagious individual. Abuse of
this defense can be limited by requiring the employer to prove
that there has been an actual loss of business creating an undue
hardship. Presumptions that business would suffer generally
should not be entertained. By using the undue hardship standard
the employer is protected from incurring any costs or suffering a
loss beyond what he would be expected to sustain from accommo-
dating a handicapped person in the usual sense of the word.
Conclusion: "Otherwise Qualified" . The safety issues con-
cerning AIDS require the courts to develop standards for assessing
the risks of transmission of a deadly disease at a time when the
disease is not fully understood. On the one hand, better-safe-
than-sorry is not a reasonable judicial approach, given the
42

potential magnitude of the discrimination problem. On the other
hand, blind reliance on public health official assurances of
safety may also be premature. A cautious approach, giving due
regard to current medical opinion, while balancing the legitimate
needs of the employer, society, co-workers, customers, and the
HIV/ARC/AIDS victim on a case-by-case basis, may be in order.
The potential economic consequences of AIDS are staggering.
Employers understandably want to avoid being saddled with a
portion of the health care and disability costs. Unfortunately,
in most jurisdictions, the best way to avoid this is to discrimi-
nate against those infected with HIV. As consequence, society not
only gets stuck with the health care bill but also must support
healthy and capable individuals. If the estimates of 1.5 million
seropositive individuals in the United States is correct, and if
mandatory testing becomes more pervasive, we are going to have a
large group of people who encounter employment discrimination. It
makes sense from society's point of view to force the employer to
hire these people. Given the structure of employment benefits in
this country, this also forces the employer, and through higher
prices, the public to assume increased insurance costs. Employers
may not be the best pool to shift these costs. Legislation
shifting this risk to the general insurance pool has been enacted
2 fi 3
or is being considered in several states. In the absence of
legislation, employers who can demonstrate undue hardship from
increased insurance or benefit costs from employing the handicap-
ped should be allowed to discriminate. This should require actual
documentation and not speculation.
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and other parasites. See , Answers About AIDS , A Report of the
American Council on Science and Health, 5 (3d ed. 1986) [herein-
after cited as Answers ]
.
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507-514 (1982).
4. Curran, supra , note 3, at 222-223. Before HIV was isolated
and identified as a necessary agent in the development of AIDS,
the CDC definition of AIDS was premised on the diagnosis of
particular diseases indicative of underlying cellular immune
deficiency. The current definition has added additional diseases
and requires that the patient be HIV positive. The diseases
include
:
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1. Kaposi Sarcoma (second most common disease in AIDS
victims)
2. Primary Lymphoma of brain
B. Protozoal and helminthic infections
1. Cryptosporidiosis
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in AIDS victims)
3. Strongyloidosis
4. Toxoplasmosis
C. Fungal infections
1. Aspergillosis
2. Candidiasis
3. Crptococcosis
D. Bacterial infections
1. Atypical mycobacteriosis
E. Viral infections
1. Cytomegalovirus
2. Herpes simplex
3. Progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy
.
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If a patient fits the survelliance definition it is reported to
CDC.
5. Answers , supra , note 1, at 5.
6 . Id. , at 5-6
.
7. Review of the Public Health Service Response to AIDS , Office
of Technology Assessment, at 4" (February 1985) [hereinafter cited
as Review ] ; Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited , 14 Hofstra
L. Rev. 28 (1985)
.
8. Review ,
.
supra , note 7, at 4.
9. Answers , supra , note 1, at 5-7.
10. Id. , at 5-7.
11. Curran, supra , note 3, at 230-233; Leonard, supra , note 7, at
19.
12. Answers , supra , note 1, at 8.
13. Update: AIDS - United States , 35 Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report 757 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Update 1986 ] .
14. Answers , supra , note 1, at 9.
15. As of 4 August 1986, however, 2 cases of AIDS from 1979 and
several cases from 1980-1981 were still alive. Answers , supra ,
note 1, at 9.
16. A previously unidentified virus was first isolated by French
scientists in 198 3 from a lymph node of a male homosexual. They
named the virus lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV) . In early
1984, American scientists isolated a virus from AIDS patients and
called it human T-cell lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III)
.
Another group of researchers isolated a virus from AIDS patients
which they called AIDS-Associated retrovirus (ARV) . The three
viruses were variants of the same virus which is now called human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) . The popular press often refers to
it as the AIDS virus. See , Answers , supra, note 1, at 10-11.
17. A retrovirus is a virus which can reverse the process of gene
expression when it infects a cell. A retrovirus has only RNA and
no DNA. When it infects a host cell it causes its RNA pattern to
transcribe on the host cell's DNA. When the host cell's DNA
replicates it creates more of the retrovirus's RNA. Review , supra ,
note 7 , at 4
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18. la, at 4.
19. Id.
20. Id., at 11; Curran, supra , note 3, at 230-231; Ho, Rota &
Schooley, Isolation of HTLV-III from Cerebrospinal and Neural
Tissues of Patients with Neurologic Syndromes Related io the
Acquired Immunoaef iciency Syndrome , 313 N. Eng . J. Med. 1493-7
(1985); Levy, Shimabukuro & Hollander, Isolation of AIDS-Asso -
ciated Retrovirus from Cerebrospinal Fluid and Brain of Pa -
tients with Neurological Symptoms , 2 Lancet 586-8 (1985).
21. Social Security Says No to Broader AIDS Definition , 2 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 11, at 4 (June 17, 1987).
22. Gottlieb, Immunologic Aspects of the Acquired Immunodefi -
ciency Syndrome and Kale Homosexuality , The Medical Clinics of
North America, 652 (May 1986).
23. Surgeon General's Report on Accquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome , U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, at 11
[hereinafter cited as Report ] ; Curran, supra , note 3, 230.
24. 100%: AMA Forum Told That HIV May Always Lead to AIDS , 2
AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 8, at 6 (May 6, 1987);
50%: In Brief , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 6, at 10
(April 8, 19 87) ;
30%: Third-World Upheaval Seen Caused by AIDS , 2 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 11, at 3-4 (June 17, 1987);
20-30%: Answers , supra , note 1, at 21;
4-20%: Curran, supra , note 3, at 232;
4-19%: National Institute of Health Conference, The
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, An Update ,
102 Annals of Int'l Med. 801 (1985).
25. Gottlieb, supra , note 22, at 652. Some of the suggested
co-factors include: presence of cytomegalovirus, Epstein-Barr
virus, or other herpes viruses; exposure to hepatitis; iatrogenic
effect of steroids and other medicines; use of alcohol and recrea-
tional drugs; cigarette smoking; antigen stimulation as a result
of various sexual practices; ethnicity; particular underlying
diseases; and psychosocial risk factors (e.g. life satisfaction,
self-esteem, depression, coping mechanism, sense of control,
social support, and stress). Review , supra , note 7, at 20.
26. Report , supra , note 23, at 10; Answers , supra , note 1, at
20-21.
27. Answers , supra , note 1, at 22-23.
28. Curran, supra , note 3, at 232. An antigen test to determine
which HIV infected individuals are at immediate risk of developing
AIDS is under development. Approval Sought for Antigen Test , 1
AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA), No. 22, at 6 (1986).
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29. Curran, supra
, note 3, at 230. Lymphadenopathy is a disease
affecting the lymph nodes which causes them to swell.
30. Mylagia is muscular pain.
31. Curran, supra , note 3, at 230.
32. Id.; Answers
, supra , note 1, at 7; Report , supra , note 23, at
5-10. Some authorities separate LAS from ARC. Others define ARC
as all illnesses associated with a depressed immune system which
do not qualify as AIDS. Generally, the illnesses associated with
ARC are not life-threatening.
33. Answers
,
supra
, note 1, at 7. An ARC diagnosis is not as
clearly defined as an AIDS diagnosis where the underlying immune
disease must fit the diagnosis of one of the specified diseases.
Consequently, greater variation in what physicians diagnose as ARC
can be expected.
34. Curran, supra
, note 3, at 232.
35. Id_.
,
at 231; Answers , supra , note 1, at 7.
36. Curran, supra , note 3, at 231; Goldstick, Mandybar & Bode,
Spinal Cord Degeneration in AIDS , 35 Neurology (Cleveland) 103-106
(1985) ; Barnes, AIDS-Related Brain Damage Unexplained , 232 Science
1091-1093 (1986).
37. Curran, supra , note 3, at 231.
38. Id.
39. Update 1986 , supra , note 13, at 758.
40. Id. , at 757-758.
41. See , Note, Educating Through the Law: The Los Angeles AIDS
Discrimination Ordinance , 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1419 (1986) .
42. Id.; Cf. 42 A.L.R. Fed. 189 (1979) (Refusal to Hire or
Discrimination from Employment on Account of Plaintiff's Sexual
Lifestyle or Sexual Preferences as Violation of Federal Consti-
tution or Federal Civil Rights Statutes)
.
43. Answers , supra , note 1, at 29-30. One recent study of 4,955
HIV positive men showed 5 testing negative at a later date. It is
not known, however, if the 5 men were entirely free of the virus
or just the antibodies. Silberner, Crowded Sessions, Long Lines
- Few Answers , 102 U.S. News & World Rep. 18 (June 15, 1987). The
infected individual poses a risk even after death. There have
been several cases of morticians refusing to handle AIDS victims
or charging increased fees.
44. Answers , supra , note 1, at 29-30.
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45. Curran , supra , note 3, at 228; Recommendations for Preven -
ting Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace ,~ 3 4
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 682 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Recommendations ]
.
46. Curran, supra , note 3, at 228.
47. Recommendations , supra , note 45, at 682.
48. Update 1986
,
supra , note 13, at 760. Lack of transmission by
other body fluids may be because of low concentrations of the
virus in the fluid. Curran, supra , note 3, at 228. Transmission
by foodborne, waterborne, or airborne means may be limited by the
virus's apparent inability to survive well in open air. Curran
Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS;
Current Status and Future Prospects , 229 Science 1355. But , see ,
Marwick, AIDS Virus Yields Data to Intensify Scientific Study , 254
J. A.M. A. 2865-2866 (1985) (HIV survived 10 days at room temperature
in a petri dish)
.
49. But , see , Calabrese & Gopalakrishna, Transmission of HTLV-
III Infection from Man to Woman tu Man , 314 N. Eng. J. Med. 987
(1986) (reporting a case of a man becoming infected after repeated
vaginal intercourse and heavy mouth to mouth kissing with an
infected woman) . See , also , Federal Prisoner Convicted for
Biting Two Guards , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) , No. 12, at 6 (1987)
(Prisoner infected with HIV who bit a guard was convicted of
assault with a dangerous and deadly weapon. The guard has not yet
tested positive for HIV.)
50. Recommendations , supra , note 45, at 682.
51. C_f. Answers , supra , note 1, at 15-16.
52. Recommendations , supra , note 45, at 691.
53. Id. , at 693.
54. Id. , at 682, 693-4.
55. Id.
56. Id. , 682; Report , supra , note 23, at 13.
57. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist.
,
_F.Supp._ , Case
No. CV-86-6609-AHS (C.D.Cal. June 19, 1987) (available on WESTLAW,
DCT database); La Rocca v. Dalshein , 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d
301, 310-11 (N.Y.Sup.Ct 1983); HIV-Positive Boy Ordered to be Re-
turned to Class , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 10, at 8 (1987);
Minnesota Policy Bans Bias
,
1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 14, at 6
(1986) .
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58. In one survey, 1 in 4 favored quarantine for AIDS victims.
Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers
, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
1241 (1986). Another example is legislation authorizing quaran-
tine. See , e.g. , Colorado Governor Signs Bill Allowing 'Restric -
tive Measures' , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) , No. 11, at 1 (1987).
School Trustee to Propose 111 Students' Segregation , 2 AIDS Pol'y
& L. (BNA), No. 12, at 9 ( 1987 ) (trustee proposes special classroom
for children with HIV infection) . But , see , Vermonters Surveyed
on Knowledge, Transmission , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. , (BNA), No. 4 , at 7
(1987) (survey in Vermont where 76% of those polled would allow
their children to attend classes with HIV infected child and 75%
thought that employer should be prohibited from discriminating
against infected individuals)
.
59. Hoffman, Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer History:
The Need for Federal Legislation , 59 Temp. L. Q. 2-6 (1986)
(discusses several studies on this subject)
.
60. See, generally , Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Ver -
sus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk , Judgement Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases 463-489 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Slovic] ; Kahneman & Tver sky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment
of Representativeness , 3 Cognitive Psychology 430-454 (1972);
Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre -
quency and Probability
,
5 Cognitive Psychology 207-232 (1973).
61 Slovic, supra , note 60, at 464. Examples of statistics not
influencing risk assessment include fear of flying or lack of fear
of smoking.
62. Id.
63. Id. , at 465-474.
64. Curran, supra , note 3, at 226.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. This is assuming that estimates of 1 to 1.5 million Americans
harbor the virus. President Reagan and Vice President Bush
recently called for wider mandatory testing. Bush Opens Meeting
by Endorsing Wider Testing Proposed by Reagan , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA), Nc. 10, at 1 (1987). Several states have considered
legislation mandating testing in various situations. In 1986
testing bills were considered in California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Intergovernmental Health
Policy Project George Washington University, AIDS Related Bills
Considered in the 1986 Legislative Sessions , 48-51 (1987).
68. Curran, supra , note 3, 226. It is much more difficult ana
less reliable to screen a person's blood for HIV directly. It is
49

not generally done. See , Classification Systems for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection in Children Under 13
Years of Age
, 36 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 226 (1987)
[hereinafter cited as Classification of Children ] . Consequently,
the lack of any documented cases of a person positive for anti-
bodies being negative for the virus does not predict that it is
impossible to eliminate the virus from the body.
69. Curran, supra
, note 3, at 227-228.
70. Id.
71. Classification of Children , supra , note 68, at 229; Answers
,
supra
, note 1, at 29.
72. Curran, supra , note 3, at 226.
73. Id.
74. Id. , at 227.
75. Lord, Carey, Work & Goode, The Staggering Price of AIDS , 102
U.S. News & World Rep. 16-17 (June 15, 1987) [hereinafter cited as
Lord]
.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; AIDS' 1991 Economic Burden Projected to Be $66 Billion
,
2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 8, at 3 (1987).
79. Intergovernmental Health Policy Project George Washington
University, A Review of State and Local Government Initiatives
Affecting AIDS , 33 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Initiatives ]
.
80. Id.
81
.
Id..
, at 31.
82. Id. , at 32.
83. Medicaid Seen Picking Up Large Share of Care Tab , 2 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 11, at 5-6 (1987).
84. Lord, supra , note 75, at 17.
85. Pentagon Says HIV Testing Shows 2,139 With Virus , 2 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 6, at 3 (1987). 1 to 1.5 million is .42 to
.63% of the entire population. The military results yielded .17%
positive of those on active duty tested and .15% positive among
applicants to the service. Id .
86. Leonard, supra , note 7, at 35.
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87. Review, supra , note 7 , at 20 . See , supra , note 25, for a
list of suggested co-factors.
88. See , e.g. , Leonard, supra , note 7, at 15.
89. Laws or regulations in several states have done this. See,
Cal. Health & Safety Code §199 . 21 (1 ) (West Supp. 1987); Prohibition
of Discrimination in the Provision of Insurance Act of 1986, D.C.
Act 6-170 (1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. §631.90 (West Supp. 1986). In
New York the state Insurance Department prohibits HIV testing as a
precondition to obtain health insurance but not life or disability
insurance, New York to Ban HIV Tests for Health Insurance , 2 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 8, at 9 (1987). In Massachusetts the state
Insurance Commission prohibits insurance companies from requiring
HIV tests, Massachusetts Considers Sanctions Against Insurers , 2
AIDS Pol'y sTTT. (BNA) No. 1, at 3 (1987).
90. See
,
generally
,
Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against
Persons With AIDS , 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 689 (1985).
91. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. §§1981 - 2000h (1982).
93. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1982).
94. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) (1982).
95. 29 U.S.C. §§621 - 634 (1982).
96. 29 U.S.C. §623(a) (1982).
97. 29 U.S.C. §623(g) (1982)
.
98. 29 U.S.C. §630(b) (1982).
99. If an individual can show that discrimination based on a
medical or physical condition has a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class the employer will not be able to discriminate because
of that condition unless there is a bona fide business necessity.
Cf . , Jefferies v. Chicago Transit Authority , 770 F.2d 676 (7th
Cir. 1985 ) (discrimination because of sickle cell anemia); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. , 635 F.2d
188 (3rd Cir. 1980 ) (discrimination because of pseudofolliculitis,
a disease generally limited to black males) ; Smith v. Olin
Chemical Corp
.
, 535 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1976) (sickle cell anemia).
100. See
,
generally , Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handi-
capped; a Legal Perspective , 27 DePaul L. Rev. 954-6 (1978)
;
Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act , 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 433 (1986) . Government
workers have been able to assert due process and equal protection
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objections to handicap discrimination when the reason for the
discrimination does not have a rationale basis.
101. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355
(1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§701-794).
102. See
,
e.g. , Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against
Persons with AIDS
, 19 Clearinghouse Review 1296-8 (1986).
103. Smith-Fess Act, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 735 (1920).
104. Discussion of these amendments is found in 1973 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2082-4.
105. 29 U.S.C. §791 (1982) .
106. 29 U.S.C. §793 (1982). Section 502 (29 U.S.C. §792) deals
with removal of architectual barriers.
107. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1982) .
108. 29 U.S.C. A. §701 (West Supp. 1986) (Congressional declaration
of purpose) . Prior versions of this section state the Congres-
sional purpose as the desire to "provide employment opportunities
for the handicapped," Pub. L. No. 93-112, §2, 87 Stat. 357 (1973)
and to guarantee equal opportunity for the handicapped, Pub. L.
No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2984 (1978).
109. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone , 465 U.S. 624, 632-4
(1984); de la Torres v. Bolger , 610 F.Supp. 593, 596 (N.D.Tex.
1985). The Act's protection is not limited to those who receive
rehabilitation services.
110. Consolidated , 465 U.S. at 632-3, n. 13; Arline v. School
Board of Nassau County , 772 F.2d 759, 764 (11th Cir. 1985) aff'd7
107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987). Congress has noted that employment of the
handicapped "is of ^critical importance [to] this Nation." White
House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, 88 Stat. 1631
(1974) . The benefit of integrating the handicapped into society
is considered significant in view of increased productivity and
decreased welfare support.
111. S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S. Code & Cong. Ad. News 6373, 6389; School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline , 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed. 2d 307, 315 (1987);
Arline , 772 F.2d at 764; Strathie v. Department of Transporta-
tion , 716 F.2d 227, 229, 231 (3rd Cir. 1983). Part of this
concern is premised on the general moral sense that is associated
with our Constitution, that all people are equal and should be
given even handed treatment.
112. 29 U.S.C. §791 (1982)
.
113. Id.
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114. See,
301-3
e.g.
(5th
,
Prewitt v. United States Post.al Se rvice, 662 F.2a
292, Cir. 1981)
.
115. See, e.g,
1985) ; Boyd v.
, Gar
Unite
dner v. Morris
id States Posta
,
752 F.2d
1 Service,
1271, 1277 (8th
752 F.2d 410,
Postal Service,
Cir.
413
(9th Cir. 1981
1318 (7th
(11th Cir.
95-602, 92
Dns with a
^ns Act wit
>) ; McGuinnes v. United istates 744
F.2d
475
No.
pers<
tati<
Cir. 1984) ; Treadwell v
1983); Prewitt 662 F.2d
Stat. 2982, codified at
complaint under sections
,h the same remedies avai
. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473,
at 302. In 1978, Pub. L.
29 U.S.C. § 794a, afforded
501 and 504 of the Rehabili
lable under section 717 of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
116. 29 C.F.R. §§1613.701 - .709 (1986).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982)
.
118. Id.
119. Drennon v. Philadelphia General Hospital , 428 F.Supp. 809,
814-6 (E.D.Pa. 1977).
120. See , e.g. , Simon v. St. Louis County , 656 F.2d 316, 319 (8th
Cir . 1981), cert denied , 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Rogers v. Frito-
Lay, Inc. , 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir. 1980); Bento v. I.T.Q.
Corp. of Rhode Island , 599 F.Supp 731, 739 (D.R.I. 1984); see ,
generally , 60 A.L.R. Fed. 329 (1982).
121. 41 C.F.R. §60-741.20 - .32 (1986).
122. 41 C.F.R. Part 60-741 (1986).
123. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1982). The executive branch was included
under this section in amendments made in 1978.
124. Id.
»
125. 31 U.S.C. 56716(b)(2) (1982).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)
127. 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1986).
128. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980 Compilation)
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. A. 2000d-l note.
129. See , e.g. , Doe v. New York University , 666 F.2d 761, 774
(2nd Cir. 1961); Simon 656 F.2d at 319; Lloyd v. Regional Trans -
portation Authority , 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
130. See e.g. , Plummer v. Branstad , 731 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1984);
Strathie , 716 F.2d at 230; Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Comm. , 704 F.2d 1402, 1408 (5th Cir. 1983); Bentaveg -
na v. United States Department of Labor , 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.
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1982); Doe 666 F.2d at 774; Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 309-10; Bento
,
599 F.Supp. at 7 74; Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Education
Agency
, 5b9 F.Supp. 1130, 1133 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
131. Under section 501, the final element is that the employer is
the executive branch or the U.S. Postal Service.
132. When courts rule that a condition is a handicap it is
usually in general terms and does not necessarily involve an in
depth examination of the plaintiff's particular condition. See
,
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline
, 94 L.Ed. 2d 307, 316-20;
Doe , 666 F.2d at 775-6; but , see , Fomsi v. Bowen , 794 F.2d 931,
933 (4th Cir 1986) (suggests a case by case determination of
handicap status without resort to lists or categories of impair-
ments)
.
133. See , e.g. , Lawyers, Legislators See Justice Department Set -
back , 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 4, at 4 (1987).
13 4. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District
,
__F.Supp.
(CD. Cal. June 19, 1987) (available on WESTLAW, DCT DatabaseTT
Local 1812, Am. Fed, of Gov't Employees v. United States Depart-
ment of State
,
_F.Supp. , Case No. 87-0121 (D.D.C. April 22,
1987) (available on WESTLAW, DCT Database); accord , Doe v.
Coughlin , 509 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211-2 (N.Y.App.Div. 1986); District
27 Community School v. Board of Education , 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1986).
135. 41 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) AA-3 (4 March 1987) (Statement of
Professor A. Leonard).
136. Initially some courts construed "otherwise qualified" to
mean qualified "but for" the handicap. Under this approach a
blind man would be qualified to drive a school bus if he was
capable of driving could he see. It is now settled that otherwise
qualified means qualified "in spite of" the handicap. South-
eastern Community College v. Davis , 442 U.S. 397, 406-7 (1979) ;
45 C.F.R. part 84, App. A at 327.
137. Southeastern , 442 U.S. 406-7; Gardner , 752 F.2d 1271, 1281
(8th Cir~. 1985) ; Prewitt , 662 F.2d at 307; Carty v. Carlin , 623
F.Supp. 1181, 1186 (D.Md. 1985); Bey v. Bolger , 540 F.Supp. 910,
926 (E.D.Pa. 1982).
138. Alexander v. Choate , 469 U.S. 287, 300-302 (1985); Gardner ,
752 F.2d at 1284.
139. Southeastern , 442 U.S. at 402-7; Strathie, 716 F.2d at 234;
Treadwell , 707 F.2d at 475.
140. See , e.g. , Gardner , 752 F.2d at 1280; Treadwell , 707 F.2d at
475; Doe , 666 F.2d at 775-6; Prewitt , 662 F.2d at 306-7.
141. See , e.g. , Treadwell , 707 F.2d at 475.
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142. Id_. (the employer has the burden of showing that the plain-
tiff is unsafe or inefficient ) . Bey v. Bolger , 540 F.Supp. 910,
926 (E.D.Pa. 1982) (to be otherwise qualified an individual must be
capable of safe and efficient performance of essential functions)
.
Cf., Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 431-2 (1971) (the
defendant failed to show that discrimination based on ig test was
valid business necessity in light of disparate impact on minori-
ties) ; Daubert v. United States Postal Serv. , 733 F.2d 1367, 1370
(10th Cir. 1984) (union contract preventing accommodation was a
valid business excuse for discrimination)
.
143. No federal court has considered this issue. The state
courts and legislatures that have considered insurance and medical
costs have rejected them as an economic hardship defense. Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §954(p) (Purdon Supp. 1987) ( "Unmsurability or
increased cost of insurance under a group or employee insurance
plan does not render a handicap or disability job related.");
State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp. , 65 N.Y.2d 213, 460
N.E.2d 695, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (N.Y. 1985) (if a person suffers
an impairment, in this case obesity, employment may not be denied
because of any actual or perceived undesirable effects on dis-
ability or life insurance programs) ; Dairy Equip. Co. v. DILHR , 95
Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330, 332, 336-7 (Wis. 1980) (higher cost to
the company for the care and treatment of handicapped respondent
if injured does not permit discrimination) ; Chrysler Outboard
Corp. v. DILHR , 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344, 345 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. 1976) (higher cost of insuring cancer victim does not justify
discrimination)
.
144. The Department of Justice, Office of General Counsel,
recently opined that contagion is not a handicap and therefore if
you discriminate against someone because they are contagious, you
are not discriminating against them solely by reason of handicap
even if they are handicapped. 122 Daily Lab. Rep. D-l (June 25,
1986) . This analysis was rejected by the Supreme Court in School
Bd. of Nassau County , 94 L.Ed. 2d 307 (1987), which held if a
handicapped person is also contagious you cannot discriminate
against them because of the contagion.
145. Private employers who do not receive federal aid or govern-
ment contracts are not prohibited from discriminating against the
handicapped under Federal law.
146. See , e.g. , Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-34-402 (1982); Ga. Code Ann.
§§34-6A-2, 4 (1984) (§34-6A-3 differs from the Federal statute by
expressly excluding communicable disease from coverage under the
act); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§46:2253 - 2254 (West 1982); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 151B, §§1, 4 (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1987); Minn.
Stat. Ann. §363.01 (West Supp. 1987).
147. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv. , 755 F.2d 1244, 1248
(6th Cir. 1985) .
148. 29 U.S.C.A. §706(8) (B) (West Supp. 1987).
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149. School Bd. of Nassua County , 94 L.Ed. 2d at 315-6.
150. See, e.g. , Jasany , 755 F.2d at 1248-50
151. See
, infra , notes 169-180. See , also , Carty v. Carlin , 623
F.Supp. 1181 (D.Md. 1985) (heart disease and a hernia considered a
handicap). Cf . , Plummer v. Branstad , 731 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.
1984 ) (Huntington ' s Chorea, a communicable disease, was considered
a handicap without discussion)
.
152. 29 C.F.R. §1613.702 (1986).
153. 41 C.F.R. §60-741.2 (1986).
154. 45 C.F.R. §84.3 (1986).
155. The fact that the regulation includes cosmetic disfiguration
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